Shoot down over the Persian Gulf

20 years ago Iran Air Fligh 655, also known as IR655, was a civilian airliner shot down by US missiles on Sunday July 3, 1988, over the Strait of Hormuz, toward the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Operated by Iran Air from Bandar Abbas, Iran, to Dubai, UAE, the aircraft flying as IR655 was destroyed by the U.S. Navy’s guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes between Bandar Abbas and Dubai, killing all 248 passengers and crew aboard, including 66 children, ranking it seventh among the deadliest airliner fatalities. Vincennes was traversing the Straits of Hormuz, inside Iranian territorial waters, at the time of the attack and IR655 was within Iranian airspace. According to the US government, an inexperienced crew mistakenly identified the Iranian Airbus A300 as an attacking F-14 Tomcat fighter. However, the Iranian government of Teheran maintained that the Vincennes knowingly shot down a civilian aircraft.

27 minutes

The plane, an Airbus A300B2, registered as EP-IBU and flown by Mohsen Rezaian, a veteran captain with 7,000 hours of flight time, left Bandar Abbas at 10:17 am Iran time, 27 minutes after its scheduled departure time. It should have been a 28-minute flight. After takeoff, it was directed by the Bandar Abbas tower to turn on its transponder and proceed over the Persian Gulf. The flight was assigned routinely to commercial air corridor Amber 59, a twenty-mile (32 km)-wide lane on a direct line to Dubai airport. The short distance made for a simple flight pattern: climb to 14,000 feet (about 4,300 m), cruise for a short time, and descend into Dubai.

On the morning of July 3, the Vincennes was passing through the Strait of Hormuz returning from an escort duty. A helicopter from the USS Vincennes received warning fire after it buzzed Iranian patrol vessels. The Vincennes then crossed into Iranian territorial waters and opened fire on Iranian gunboats. The USS Sides (FFG-14) and USS Elmer Montgomery (FF-1082) were nearby. It was shortly after this gunfire exchange that Iran Air Flight 655 approached to begin its transit of the Straits. The USS Vincennes fired missiles at the airliner, destroying it and causing it to fall into the waters of the Gulf. The event triggered an intense controversy, with Iran condemning the shootdown as a «barbaric act.» In mid-July 1988, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati asked the United Nations Security Council to condemn the United States saying the downing «could not have been a mistake» and was a «criminal act,» an «atrocity» and a «massacre.» George H.W. Bush, at the time Vice President of the United States in the Reagan Administration, defended his country at the United Nations by arguing that the shootdown had been a wartime incident and that the crew of the Vincennes had acted appropriately to the situation at the time. The Soviet Union asked the US to withdraw from the area and supported efforts made by the Security Council to end the Iran-Iraq war. The remainder of the 13 delegates that spoke echoed the US position saying one of the problems was that a 1987 resolution to end the Iran-Iraq war had been ignored. Following the debate, Security Council Resolution 616 was passed expressing «deep distress» over the downing, «profound regret» for the loss of life, and stressed the need to end the Iran-Iraq war as resolved in 1987.

The two SM-2MR surface-to-air missiles

According to the US government, the Vincennes mistakenly identified the Iranian airliner as an attacking military fighter. The officers identified the flight profile being flown by the Airbus A300B2 as being similar to that of an F-14A Tomcat during an attack run. The commercial flight had originated at Bandar Abbas, which served dual roles as a base for Iranian F-14 operations and as a hub for commercial, civilian flights. According to the same reports, the Vincennes tried unsuccessfully to contact the approaching aircraft, four times on the military emergency frequency and three times on the civilian emergency frequency, but never on air traffic control frequencies. As seen on «Mayday» on Discovery channel, the USS Vincennes could have used the squawk code to advise Iran Air 655 that they were indeed speaking to them and not another aircraft, however using the squawk code is not normal practice and hence was not used. If the squawk code was used the captain of Iran Air 655 would have known the USS Vincennes was speaking to him, and the whole incident could have been avoided. Also noted is that the USS Vincennes claims that Iran Air was descending, which it never did.

At 10:24 am, with the civilian jet 11 nautical miles (20 km) away, the Vincennes fired two SM-2MR surface-to-air missiles which both hit Flight 655. After the engagement, the Vincennes’ crew realized that the plane had been a civilian airliner.

This version was finalized in a report by Admiral William Fogarty, entitled Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988. Only parts of this report have been released (part I in 1988 and part II in 1993), which has drawn criticism from many observers. The Fogarty report stated, «The data from USS Vincennes tapes, information from USS Sides and reliable intelligence information, corroborate the fact that [Iran Air Flight 655] was on a normal commercial air flight plan profile, in the assigned airway, squawking Mode III 6760, on a continuous ascent in altitude from take-off at Bandar Abbas to shoot-down.»
When questioned in a 2000 BBC documentary, the US government stated in a written answer that they believed the incident may have been caused by a simultaneous psychological condition amongst the 18 bridge crew of the Vincennes called ‘scenario fulfilment’, which is said to occur when persons are under pressure. In such a situation, the men will carry out a training scenario, believing it to be reality while ignoring sensory information that contradicts the scenario. In the case of this incident, the scenario was an attack by a lone military aircraft. The U.S. government issued notes of regret for the loss of human life and in 1996 paid reparations to settle a suit brought in the International Court of Justice regarding the incident. It never admitted wrongdoing, accepted responsibility, nor apologized for the incident. In August 1988 Newsweek quoted then vice president George Bush as saying; «I’ll never apologize for the United States of America. Ever, I don’t care what the facts are.» in regard to the shoot down. An independent investigation by the ICAO concluded that the US was at fault by cultivating an unstable battle scenario with no regard for civilian air traffic.

According to the Iranian government, the shooting down of IR 655 by the Vincennes was an intentionally performed and unlawful act. Even if there was a mistaken identification, which Iran has not accepted, it argues that this constituted gross negligence and recklessness amounting to an international crime, not an accident.
In particular, Iran expressed skepticism about claims of mis-identification, noting that the Vincennes had advanced AEGIS radar that correctly tracked the flight and its Mode III beacon; two other U.S. warships in the area, Sides and Montgomery, identified the aircraft as civilian; and the flight was well within a recognized international air corridor. It also noted that the crew of the Vincennes was trained to handle simultaneous attacks by hundreds of enemy aircraft. Iran found it more plausible that the Vincennes «hankered for an opportunity to show its stuff». According to Iran, the U.S. had previously issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) warning aircraft that they were at risk of «defensive measures» if they had not been cleared from a regional airport and if they came within 5 nautical miles of a warship at an altitude of less than 2000 feet.» IR 655 had been cleared from a regional airport and was well outside those limits when it was attacked.

The civil aviation frequencies

Throughout its final flight IR655 was in radio contact with various air traffic control services using standard civil aviation frequencies, and had spoken in English to Bandar Abbas Approach Control seconds before the Vincennes launched its missiles. According to the U.S. Navy investigation the Vincennes at that time had no equipment suitable for monitoring civil aviation frequencies, other than the International Air Distress frequency. Subsequently U.S. Navy warships in the area were equipped with dialable VHF radios, and access to flight plan information was sought, to better track commercial airliners.

The official ICAO report stated that 10 attempts were made to contact Iran Air flight 655: seven on military frequencies and three on commercial frequencies, addressed to an «unidentified Iranian aircraft» and giving its speed as 350 knots (650 km/h). Indeed both Sides and Vincennes tried contacting flight 655 on several civilian and military frequencies. However IR655 was arguably not «unidentified» as its commercial Mode III Transponder was active and squawking its assigned 6760 identifier code. It was traveling at an airspeed of 300 knots (560 km/h). The reference to «350 knots» was its speed over ground, as observed by radar.International investigations concluded that the crew of IR655 assumed that the three calls that they received before the missiles struck must have been directed at an Iranian P3.

The ship’s crew did not efficiently consult commercial airliner schedules, due to confusion over which time zone the schedules referred to. The airliner’s departure was 27 minutes later than scheduled. «The CIC was also very dark, and the few lights that it did have flickered every time the Vincennes fired at the speedboats. This was of special concern to Petty Officer Andrew Anderson, who first picked up Flight 655 on radar and thought that it might be a commercial aircraft. As he was searching in the Navy’s listing of commercial flights, he apparently missed Flight 655 because it was so dark.»

An Iranian P-3 was in the area some time before the attack, thought to be flying a «classic targeting profile», and in some reports providing an explanation no radar signals were detected from Iran Air Flight 655. Other reports state that the Airbus was immediately detected after takeoff by Vincennes’s AN/SPY-1 radar at a range of 47 miles (76 km).

The Psychology

The crew of the Vincennes Combat Information Center (CIC) confusingly reported the plane as ascending and descending at the same time (there were two «camps»). This seems to have happened because the Airbus’ original CIC track, number 4474, had been replaced by the Sides track, number 4131, when the computer recognised them as one and the same. Shortly thereafter, track 4474 was re-assigned by the system to an American A-6, several hundred miles away, which was following a descending course at the time. Apparently not all the crew in the CIC realized the track number had been switched on them.

The psychology and mindset after engaging in a battle with Iranian gunboats. There are claims that Vincennes was engaged in an operation using a decoy cargo ship to lure Iranian gunboats to a fight. However, those claims are denied by Fogarty in «Hearing Before The Investigation Subcommittee and The Defense Policy Panel of The Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session, July 21, 1992». Also, the initial claims of Vincennes being called for help by a cargo ship attacked by Iranian gunboats have been ruled out. That leads to claims that the Iranian gunboats were provoked by helicopters inside Iranian waters and not the other way around. This might have contributed to the mistakes made. The actual reasons for the Vincennes’ engagement with gunboats is not so clear to this date.

In February 1996 the United States agreed to pay Iran US$131,8 million in settlement to discontinue a case brought by Iran against the U.S. in the International Court of Justice relating to this incident, together with other earlier claims before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. US$61,8 million of the claim was in compensation for the 248 Iranians killed in the shootdown ($300,000 per wage-earning victim, $150,000 per non-wage-earner). It was not disclosed how the remaining $70 million of the settlement was apportioned. Further compensation was paid for the 38 non-Iranian deaths. The payment of compensation was explicitly characterized by the US as being on an ex gratia basis, and the U.S. denied having any responsibility or liability for what happened.

Author: Petro Kharchenko / Captain 3rd rank in retirement